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LOST IN THE SHUFFLE:
STATE-RECOGNIZED TRIBES AND THE TRIBAL GAMING INDUSTRY
This article presents the emerging argument that Native American tribes that have received
state but not federal recognition have a legal right to engage in gaming under state law. This
argument is based on five points: that 1) the regulation of gaming is generally a state right; 2) state
tribes are sovereign governments with the right to game, except as preempted by the federal
government; 3) federal law does not preempt gaming by state tribes; 4) state tribal gaming does not
violate Equal Protection guarantees; and 5) significant policy arguments weigh in favor of gaming
by state tribes under state law.
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“Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law … is the principle that those powers which are
lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of
Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.
… What is not expressly limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty.”4

1

The authors thank the University of San Francisco School of Law, Professor Peter Jan Honigsberg,

and Sangeeta Puri, U.S.F. School of Law Class of 2007, for their assistance with this article.
2

Alexa Koenig is an instructor and adjunct professor at the University of San Francisco School of

Law. She earned her B.A. summa cum laude from the University of California, Los Angeles and
her J.D. magna cum laude from the University of San Francisco, where she was managing editor of
the U.S.F. Law Review. Ms. Koenig’s private practice focuses on public interest, intellectual
property, and tribal law.
3

Jonathan Stein is a trial lawyer in Santa Monica, California. His record in litigation in the past 13

years is 42 wins and 5 losses. Mr. Stein graduated Harvard College magna cum laude in 1979, and
University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1983, where he was an editor of vols. 130 and 131 of the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Before beginning his own practice in 1992, Mr. Stein was
associated with the New York office of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, the Los Angeles office of
Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, and the Los Angeles office of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison.
4

FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1945).

2

I.
II.

III.

IV.

Introduction
The Histories Behind Two State-Recognized Tribes Demonstrate the Arbitrariness of Federal Recognition
A.
The State Recognized Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe of the Los Angeles Basin
B.
The State Recognized Shinnecock Indian Nation of New York
States and State Recognized Tribes Have the Authority To Enter Into Class III Gaming Agreements
A.
The Regulation of Gaming is Generally a State Right
B.
Tribes are Sovereign Governments with Inherent Rights, Including the Right to Game, Except As
Preempted by the Federal Government
C.
The Federal Government Has Only Preempted the Field of Gaming By Federally Recognized Tribes,
Not Gaming By State Citizens, State Corporations or State-Recognized Tribes
1.
The Cabazon Case
2.
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”)
3.
IGRA Does Not Preempt State Tribal Gaming Because IGRA Does Not Apply to State
Recognized Tribes
a.
State Tribal Gaming Falls Outside IGRA’s Preemptive Field
b.
Even if Gaming By State Recognized Tribes Falls Within IGRA’s Preemptive Field,
State Regulation Is Consistent With IGRA and Therefore Allowable
4.
State Tribal Gaming Is Also Not Preempted by the Federal Johnson Act
D.
Gaming by State-Recognized Tribes Does Not Violate Equal Protection
1.
The Mancari Doctrine and Artichoke Joe’s
2.
Application of Mancari and Artichoke Joe’s To Gaming By State-Recognized Tribes
a.
The Distinction Between Gaming by State Recognized Tribes Versus Non-Indian
Gaming Interests Represents a Political Classification
b.
Legitimate State Interests Justify Granting Federal and State Recognized Tribes a
Monopoly on Class III Gaming
E.
Significant Policy Arguments Support Gaming By State Recognized Tribes
1.
Proceeds From Tribal Gaming Benefit States and Tribes By Generating Much Needed Jobs
and Revenue
2.
State Recognition Is a Viable Alternative To The Unwieldy Federal Recognition Process
3.
Gaming By State Recognized Tribes Respects State and Tribal Sovereignty
Conclusion

3

I. Introduction
Federal recognition of Native American tribes, and the rights that attend such recognition,
have rarely been the subject of such widespread interest as they are today. Tribes are redefining
their place in society based on the influx of money and power that has come with tribal gaming – a
right currently exercised only by federally recognized tribes. In just 16 years, the tribal gaming
industry has grown from $100 million to more than $15 billion.5 According to one recent report,
tribal gaming generated a staggering $18.5 billion dollars in 2004 alone.6 But what gaming rights
may be exercised by state-recognized tribes?
There is a subset of America’s tribal population whose rights have been largely overlooked.
That subset consists of Indian tribes that have been subjugated -- but never officially recognized -by the federal government. So obvious has been their continued existence, however, that the states
in which they reside have officially recognized them as sovereign governments that continue to this
day.
This category of Native America’s organized political tribal groups – “state recognized
tribes”7 -- occupies an even less understood legal status than their federally-recognized counterparts.
5

See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Press Release (June 30, 2004).
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See National Indian Gaming Association, An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Indian Gaming

in 2004 at 2, available at http://www.indiangaming.org (last visited June 10, 2005). See also Doug
Abrams, State’s Indian Casinos Earn $4.2 Billion, THE DESERT SUN (July 7, 2004) (reporting the
findings of the Meister Report as written by Alan Meister for Analysis Group; this report noted that
in 2003, tribal gaming generated $4.2 billion in California alone, and $16 billion nationwide).
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they reside, and therefore are also “state recognized.” However, for the sake of clarity, we refer to
tribes that have not received formal federal recognition as “state recognized” or “state tribes,” and
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State-recognized tribes face an inconsistent and uncertain scope of powers that varies dramatically
between states. Today, thirteen states – Alabama, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma and Virginia8 -recognize Indian tribes not acknowledged by the federal government.
In this article, we present the emerging argument that state-recognized tribes – like those
with formal federal recognition – have a legal right to engage in gaming under state law. We also
profile two state-recognized tribes – the Gabrielino-Tongva of California and the Shinnecock Indian
Nation of New York – to showcase the historical similarities between federal and state tribes, and
illustrate the inequities involved in preventing state tribes from opening casinos of their own.
Tribal-state relations have been contentious for centuries, as tribal and non-tribal
populations conflicted over resources held by tribes but desired by the general population, such as
land and other natural resources. Accordingly, most federal tribal law is built on the premise that
state governments and tribes oppose one another and the federal government must protect Indians
from the depredations of state governments and the general populace.9 Today, a new model is
those that have achieved the additional level of federal recognition as “federally recognized” or
“federal tribes.”
8

This list was compiled through online and statutory research, as well as a series of phone

interviews with state organizations responsible for coordinating tribal interaction with their
respective state.
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For example, the Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, gave the federal government

exclusive authority over the disposition of all tribal lands, in order to provide oversight of land
transfers by Native American political groups. It was specifically passed to protect tribes from the
predatory efforts of states and other entities that took advantage of tribal poverty to extract from
Indian tribes valuable tribal lands at cheap prices. See 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indians § 112 (2004).
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forming, as state and tribal governments realize the mutual economic and social benefits that can
emerge from tribal gaming. When states and state tribes want to work together, such federal
“protection” becomes not only unnecessary, it can hinder the very rights the federal government
purportedly wishes to protect.
The argument that state-recognized tribes should be able to game under state law also
reflects broad principles of federalism: can the federal government limit the political rights of tribes
that it does not acknowledge, especially in an area such as gaming, which has traditionally been
subject to state control? Should states have the right to compact with tribes that the state recognizes
as government entities, based upon state and tribal sovereignty alone? Beneath these themes also lie
fundamental notions of civil and natural rights: when the system of federal recognition takes
decades to complete, should non-federally recognized tribal governments be required to forego
much needed economic opportunities for their members?
The history of Indian gaming is already well documented, and is better sought in the sources
upon which this article builds.10 Instead, Section II of this article briefly reviews the welldocumented history of two state-recognized tribes – the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe of California and
the Shinnecock Tribe of New York – to provide context for our arguments. As these profiles make
10

For a general overview of the history of tribal gaming, see Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law,

StatePolicy, and Indian Gaming , 4 N.V.L.J. 285, 287 (2004) (explaining that Indian gaming
originated with bingo operations in California and Florida in the 1970s). For a more detailed
overview of how Indian gaming evolved in California, see, e.g., Hotel Employees & Rest.
Employees Int’l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1999); K. Alexa Koenig, Gambling on
Proposition 1A: The California Indian Self-Reliance Initiative, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1033 (2002); and
Michael Lombardi, Long Road Traveled III: California Indian Self Reliance and the Battle for 1A,
http://www.cniga.com/facts/history.php (last visited July 28, 2005).
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clear, the histories of state tribes are often no less documented or legitimate than those of their
federally recognized counterparts, even though these two tribes continue to be denied recognition as
sovereigns by the United States. Absent federal acknowledgment and the political rights
acknowledgement bestows, such state tribes are unnecessarily held back from providing a better
life for the members of their tribal governments.
In Section III, we present a five-part argument in support of state tribal gaming. We explain
that 1) the regulation of gaming is generally a state right; 2) state tribes are sovereign governments
with the right to game, except as preempted by the federal government; 3) federal law does not
preempt gaming by state tribes and so states have the intrinsic power to enter into gaming compacts
with the state tribes they recognize; 4) state tribal gaming does not violate Equal Protection
guarantees, much as gaming by federally recognized tribes complies with 14th Amendment
mandates; and 5) significant policy arguments weigh in favor of permitting gaming by state tribes
under state law.11
II.

The Histories Behind Two State-Recognized Tribes Demonstrate the Arbitrariness of

Federal Recognition
A.

The State Recognized Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe of the Los Angeles Basin
Of the tribes that have never been granted formal federal recognition, the Gabrielino-Tongva

Tribe, which was recognized by California in 1994, is one of the best documented. The Gabrielinos
once occupied villages from Topanga Canyon in Malibu south to the Newport Beach estuary, and
inland to just shy of the city of San Bernardino.12 Over 2,800 archeological sites, state and federal
11

This article does not reach or otherwise consider the parallel argument that state tribes may

conduct gaming based solely upon their limited but inherent sovereign powers.
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According to Thomas Blackburn, “The territory once occupied by the wider Gabrielino group

included the greater portion of Los Angeles county, half of Orange County, parts of San Bernardino
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historical records, and Catholic Church records confirm the tribe’s history in the Los Angeles
basin.13 The BIA identified and registered hundreds of members of the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe in
the published California Indian Rolls of 1928, 1950 and 1972. Additionally, “blood quantum
certificates” have been awarded to two more generations of children, many of whom are now adult
members of the 900-member tribe.
Physical evidence of Gabrielino-Tongva culture in Los Angeles is widespread: the State of
California has registered an historical site in West Los Angeles where Tongva tribal members
shared spiritual natural groundwater springs in 1770 with one of the two expeditions that led to the
founding of the City of Los Angeles.

14

Loyola Marymount University dedicated a garden to

Tongva history in 2000, and its main university library permanently exhibits artifacts from Tongva
village sites unearthed during campus construction. Other historic sites have been uncovered at Cal
State Long Beach, the Sheldon Reservoir in Pasadena, the Los Encinos State Historical Park in
Encino, and most recently by ongoing construction at the City of Los Angeles megaproject, Playa
Vista.15

and Riverside Counties, and the islands of Santa Catalina, San Clemente, and probably San
Nicolas.” Thomas Blackburn, ETHNOHISTORIC DESCRIPTIONS OF GABRIELINO MATERIAL CULTURE
8-9 (University of California Los Angeles, 1963).
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See THOMAS BLACKBURN, ETHNOHISTORIC DESCRIPTIONS OF GABRIELINO MATERIAL CULTURE

(University of California Los Angeles, 1963).
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See California Office of Historic Preservation, http://ohp.parks.ca.gov/default.asp?page_id=21427

(last visited August 3, 2005) (describing site number 522, “Serra Springs”).
15

See Cecilia Rasmussen, LA Scene: Southern California Then and Now, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb.

28, 1994, at B3. See also Cal State University Long Beach, About Puvunga: Background on
Puvunga and the Sacred Site Struggle, at http://www.csulb.edu/~eruyle/puvudoc_0000_about.html
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The tribe’s unfortunate relationship with the United States is equally well documented,
despite the tribe’s lack of federal status. After California gained statehood in 1845, the 1848 Gold
Rush and the explosion of non-native and non-Spanish populations created an immediate desire to
define and delimit aboriginal rights. In 1851-52, President Millard Fillmore appointed three U.S.
Government Treaty Commissioners to quickly sign 18 federal treaties with California tribes,
including the Gabrielino-Tongva. The treaties were intended to reserve 8.5 million acres of
reservation land for California Indian tribes, in exchange for the Indians’ quitclaim of aboriginal
title to a total of 75 million acres of California land. The reservation promised in the Gabrielino’s
treaty included tens of thousands of acres known as the San Sebastian Reserve at the Tejon Pass at
the edge of modern Los Angeles County.16 The federal government and its 18 treaties sought to
bring order and protection, no matter how minimal, to the Native American populations pressed by
the rapid disappearance of the California frontier. However, after lobbying by California business
interests, the United States Senate refused to ratify any of the 18 treaties, and instead placed an
“injunction of secrecy” on their existence. After the Gabrielino treaty failed ratification, the San
Sebastian reserve was illicitly transferred and became the personal property of the Superintendent of
Indian Affairs, Edward Beale, who renamed the property “Tejon Ranch.” Today, Tejon Ranch is
one of the largest private land holdings in California.17

(last visited April 2, 2004); Nick Madigan, Developer Unearths Burial Ground and Stirs Up Anger
Among Indians, NEW YORK TIMES, June 2, 2004, at A13.
16

San Sebastian was a 75,000-acre reservation to which a number of Gabrielino families were

relocated. For more information on San Sebastian Reserve, see
http://www.frazmtn.com/~rrchs/tejonie.html (last visited July 28, 2005).
17

See id.
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The 18 “lost treaties” were ultimately discovered in a locked desk drawer in the Senate
Archives in 1905.18 Upon their discovery, a series of flawed legal efforts were made over the next
seven decades to redress the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe’s subjugation. Treatyless, and now landless,
the Tribe was never subsequently acknowledged by the United States, despite the unofficial
recognition of their tribal status through the treaty-making that was authorized by President Millard
Fillmore in 1851.
One such effort to address the tribe’s plight was passage of the California Jurisdiction Act of
19
1928. The Jurisdiction Act authorized the California Attorney General to represent “landless

Indians,” to gain compensation for their unresolved equitable and land claims in the U.S. Court of
Claims. However, two salient characteristics doomed the effectiveness of the land claims
settlement effort. First, no land claims settlement was offered to the tribe itself, but only to
individual tribal members and their descendents, who were deemed “landless Indians.” And
second, money and not land was offered, avoiding the ticklish question of federal status and
acknowledgment of the treatyless tribe.20

18

See Previous Recognition by the United States Government of the Tsnungwe Tribe, available at

http://www.dcn.davis.ca/us~ammon/tsnungwe/treaties.html (last visited July 27, 2005). Because of
these and similar violations of established treaties, California Indians now own less than one-fifth of
the land on a per capita basis of tribal members in other states. See Koenig, supra note 11, at 1052
n.141 (citing California Indians Past and Present, Alliance of California Tribes Website,
http://www.allianceofcatribes.org/californiaindians.htm).
19

45 Stat. 602 (May 18, 1928), as amended 46 Stat. 259 (April 29, 1930).
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See id.
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Fourteen years later, in California Indians v. United States,21 the federal court recognized the
arguments of the young California Attorney General Earl Warren that “a promise [was] made to
these tribes and bands of Indians and accepted by them but … was never fulfilled.”22 Acting to
recognize the equitable claims of the Gabrielinos and “all the Indians of California,” the Court
awarded seven cents an acre as compensation to individual “landless Indians” for the 8.5 million
acres of reservation lands that were to be set aside for federal Indian reservations under the 18 lost
treaties. At the time of the treaties’ making, some 94 years earlier, no public lands had been
purchased by the United States for less than $1 per acre – fourteen times what was ultimately
awarded. No compensation was attempted for the 75 million acres of California land actually taken
from California Indian tribes, other than payment for the 8.5 million acres of reservation lands, and
no federal acknowledgment was given to the Indian tribes who had signed the 18 lost treaties. The
court awarded no interest for the 94-year period between signature of the 1851-52 treaties and 1944,
but did deduct the costs of administration from the award given.23
After WWII reminded the public of the sacrifices of Native American soldiers, the 1944
settlement amount was recognized as inadequate and a second effort to settle land claims began.
Congress established the Indian Claims Commission, which was empowered to hear a broad range
of claims by landless Indians against the United States, including claims for the United States taking
24
aboriginal title to lands. In addition, $10,000 of the “Indians of California” funds in the United

States Treasury was authorized for services to be rendered by an attorney in accordance with any

21

Indians of California v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 583 (1942).

22

Id.

23

See id.

24

25 U.S.C. § 70.
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contract of employment which might be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.25 The
Gabrielino-Tongva and other Southern California tribes filed a land claim suit before the Indian
Claims Commission, known as Docket 80. The Southern California tribes were known as “Mission
Band Indians,”26 because of their prior enslavement by the Spanish to build the historic Catholic
missions of Southern California. The Mission Band Indians were a separate classification from the
“Indians of California,” and were comprised of survivors of the 47 bands of Gabrielino, Diegueno,
27

Luiseno, Serrano, and Juaneno tribes of Mission Indians.

After years of pursuing their case in the Indian Claims Commission, the Mission Indians
received an offer for an out-of-court settlement made by the United States to all California Indians,
including the Mission Band Indians.28 The land claims settlement awarded $633 to each federallyregistered member of the Gabrielino Tribe, which amount was paid in 1972, some 121 years after
the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe signed their treaty. However, no attempt was made to consider or
resolve the federal status or the land claims of the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe itself.
The failure of the 1946 Indian Claims Commission to adequately address the tribe’s
sovereign status or to settle the tribe’s land claims may be explained, in part, as a long-lasting byproduct of the Eisenhower Administration’s “assimilation policy,” expressed legislatively as House
Concurrent Resolution 108 of 1953. Under this policy, the United States Government terminated
53 federal Indian rancherias in California and dissolved the previously recognized tribal sovereigns.

25

60 Stat. 348, 361 (1946).

26

Baron Long (El Capitan) and other Bands of Mission Indians of California v. United States, 122

Ct. Cls. 419 (1952).
27

Id.

28

See Florence C. Shipek, Mission Indians and Indians of California Land Claims, AMERICAN

INDIAN QUARTERLY 409, 417 (1989).
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The tribal members were paid cash and otherwise encouraged to “assimilate,” as if they were part of
an amorphous immigrant group rather than a subjugated tribal sovereign. Notably, the Gabrielino’s
settlement and the “assimilation policy” were both administered by Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Dillon S. Myer, who had previously served as chief administrator of the Japanese internment camps
in California.29 In 1983, the unlawfulness of the Eisenhower “assimilation policy” was recognized
by the federal government, which stipulated in Hardwick v. United States to reinstate federal
acknowledgment to 14 terminated tribes.

30

Unfortunately, because the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe

was not a terminated rancheria tribe, the reversal of the assimilation policy provided no remedy to
the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe.
Today, however, the tribe and its 900 members continue as a political group, thanks in part
to the State of California. California officially recognized the Gabrielino-Tongva as a California
Indian tribe in Joint Resolution Number 96, Chapter 146 of the Statutes of 1994. The resolution
made the Gabrielino-Tongva tribe one of only two non-federal tribes recognized by the state.

31

The

Resolution reads:
Be it … Resolved by the Assembly and Senate of the State of California,
Jointly, that the State of California recognizes the Gabrielinos as the
aboriginal tribe of the Los Angeles Basin and takes great pride in recognizing

29

See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of

Decolonizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 221-222 (1986)
(explaining that Meyer was in charge of the federal government’s overall termination plan).
30

Civil No. 79-1710 (N.D. Cal. 1983), available at http://sorrel.humboldt.edu/~nasp/hardwick.html

(last visited June 8, 2005).
31

The Juanenos Tribe of Orange County has also received state recognition. See Cal. Jt. Res. 48,

Chapter 121, 1993-1994 Leg. Sess. (Sept. 22, 1993).
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the Indian inhabitance of the Los Angeles Basin and the continued existence
32
of the Indian community within our state.
Despite the tribe’s state recognition, despite its well-documented history of physical
evidence in the Los Angeles Basin, and despite its equally well-documented history of interaction
with the United States, the federal government has yet to formally “acknowledge” the GabrielinoTongva as an Indian tribe. The Gabrielino-Tongva’s lack of federal status prevents the tribe from
acquiring federal rights or assistance granted to 109 other California Indian tribes, many of which
share a similar history.

33

The tribe began the formal federal recognition process in 1994, but like the

hundreds of other tribes waiting for federal acknowledgment, resolution of their federal status is still
years, if not decades away, due to the time that it takes to satisfy all of the BIA’s requirements for
federal recognition, and because the BIA generally only resolves two petitions for recognition a
year.
Today, the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe hopes to establish tribal gaming under state law. The
tribe is taking a cooperative approach to gain the right to engage in tribal gaming to generate
revenue to support its tribal government and its 900 tribal members. The tribe hopes to establish a
cultural museum and catacomb to preserve the many archaeological and human remains now owned
by the tribe, and to bring much needed jobs and increased tourism to Los Angeles County. A recent
economic report estimates that 47,200 jobs would be created by the Tongva Casino & Resort, and
over $4.2 billion in new economic activity would be generated in Los Angeles County, including $3
32

Cal. Jt. Res. 96, Chapter 146, 1993-1994 Leg. Sess. (1994).

33

California’s tribes have had an especially difficult time: “[A]lthough California Indians make up

twelve percent of Indians nationwide, they receive less than one percent of all federal general
assistance funds.” Koenig, supra note 11, at 1033 n.6; see also California Indians Past and
Present, Alliance of California Tribes Website, at
http://www.allianceofcatribes.org/californiaindians.htm (last visited August 13, 2004).
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billion from increased tourism alone. This new economic activity, and the tribe’s willingness to
share 20% of their net gaming revenue, is estimated to generate as much as $687 million annually
to federal state, county and local government revenues in the first year alone.34 These financial
contributions and the tribe’s legal, historical and equitable arguments have earned the support of a
diverse coalition of business, labor and minority groups interested in improving the Los Angeles
County economy, and especially its tourist industry.35
B.

The State-Recognized Shinnecock Indian Nation of New York
Unlike the landless Gabrielino-Tongva, the 1300-member Shinnecock Indian Nation of New

York has managed to retain approximately 1200 acres of their original lands in the form of a state36
recognized reservation near the east end of Long Island. However, even this acreage represents a

significant loss over lands the tribal nation once governed; in 1703, the tribe had exclusive control
over approximately 3600 acres secured through a 1,000 year lease with New York state. That

34

See Alan Meister, The Analysis Group, The Potential Economic and Fiscal Impact of the

Proposed Gabrielino Casino Resort on Los Angeles, July 8, 2005 (report on file with the authors).
35

The significant economic and social benefits that can be generated from urban gaming are evident

in Michigan, where Proposition E (a 1996 referendum that authorized the creation of three Class III
casinos in Detroit, an historically black city with a high poverty rate) helped revitalize the local
economy. For information on the history of Proposition E, see, e.g., Lac Vieux Desert Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Michigan Gaming Control Board, 276 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir.
2002). See also Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 432.201 et seq
(1996) (which interpreted and expanded upon Proposition E).
36

See Shinnecock Indian Nation History, Shinnecock Indian Nation Website,

http://www.shinnecocknation.com/history.asp (last visited July 14, 2005).
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holding dwindled to a mere 800 acre reservation in 1859 in a largely one-sided, state friendly deal
designed to extend the Long Island Rail Road through the tribe’s property.37
As noted by the tribe, it is “among the oldest self-governing tribes of Indians in the United
States.”38 However, despite its more than 200 years of official recognition by the state of New
York, almost 400 years of contact with white settlers, and thousands of years in the greater New
39
York area, the tribe has yet to be recognized by the United States federal government. The tribe

first applied for formal recognition with the BIA in 1978; more than 25 years have already passed
40

without resolution.

Over the last several decades, the tribe has undertaken several forms of economic
development to provide for its continued governance and the prosperity of its people. However,
long term efforts to lease land to nearby farmers have been hampered by serious pesticide leakage,
which severely polluted the tribe’s drinking water. A shell fish hatchery, which took advantage of

37

See Community Profile: Shinnecock Reservation, NEWSDAY,

http:www.newsday.com/extras/lihistory/spectown/hist008f.htm (last visited August 9, 2004). See
also Michael Powell, Old Money and Old Grievances Clash in Haven of the Very Rich; Tribe’s
Lawsuit Seeks Return of 3,600 Acres of Prime Long Island Land, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 25,
2005.
38

Shinnecock Indian Nation History, Shinnecock Indian Nation Website,

http://www.shinnecocknation.com/history.asp (last visited July 14, 2005).
39

See Shinnecock, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (Houghton Mifflin),

http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/naind/html/na_035800_shinnecock.htm (last visited
August 9, 2004).
40

See Shinnecock Indian Nation History, Shinnecock Indian Nation Website,

http://www.shinnecocknation.com/history.asp (last visited July 14, 2005).

16

the tribe’s coastal location, also had to be terminated due to pollution. An annual powwow is now
the tribe’s greatest money maker, but even that has proven inconsistent thanks to uncertain weather;
even in good years, income from the powwow must be supplemented through state grants.41
Consequently, the tribe is working to secure the right to open a casino to generate the funds needed
to help their government and members thrive.42 As one of the biggest proponents of gaming by state
recognized tribes, the tribe is currently involved in extensive litigation to determine whether it has
43
the right to open a casino on its tribal lands, despite its lack of federal recognition. At least one

federal judge appears to have sympathized with the tribe’s frustration at its lack of federal
recognition and inability to game without it. In New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation,44 the United
States was ordered to appear as a “involuntary plaintiff,” which would have effectively made the

41

See Shinnecock, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (Houghton Mifflin),

http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/naind/html/na_035800_shinnecock.htm (last visited
July 14, 2005).
42

See Shinnecock Indian Nation History, Shinnecock Indian Nation Website,

http://www.shinnecocknation.com/history.asp (last visited July 14, 2005). See also Bruce Lambert,
Shinnecock Tribe Plans Suit, Claiming Land in Hamptons, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 12, 2005).
43

See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also

Shinnecock Indian Nation Website, http://www.shinnecocknation.com (last visited July 14, 2005).
Another vocal proponent of state tribal gaming is the state recognized Unkechaug Nation, which has
also been trying to open a casino without federal recognition. See, e.g., Carruthers v. Flaum, 365 F.
Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Steve Israel, Unkechaug Nation buys land near Kutsher’s, TIMES
HERALD-RECORD, http://www.recordonline.com/archive/2004/06/15/index.html (last visited July
14, 2005).
44

280 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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court’s orders binding upon the federal government. Judge Platt suggested he might eventually
require the United States to formally recognize the Shinnecock tribe.45
Although the court eventually dismissed the United States with prejudice, the tribe’s case
continues. In the meantime, the Shinnecock have pursued a different route then the Gabrielino
tribe, no longer passively sitting back and waiting out the legal process. Instead, the tribe has taken
controversial first steps towards opening a casino without having secured federal recognition,
including preparing a site for casino construction. 46 Most recently, the tribe has demonstrated its
frustration with the lack of recognition of its gaming rights by commencing a spectacular lawsuit
claiming up to $150 billion dollars of “back rent” for current and past use of aboriginal land in the
Hamptons. The tribe has offered to abandon the lawsuit in exchange for recognition of its right to
47

open a casino.
III.

States and State-Recognized Tribes Have the Authority To Enter Into Gaming Compacts

Outside of IGRA

45

See Ann Givens, Shinnecock Case Could Set National Precedent, NEWSDAY (Jan. 26, 2004),

available at http://www.shinnecocknation.com/news/news74.aspx (last visited March 22, 2004)
(discussing the potential role of the judiciary in the federal recognition process of the Shinnecock
Tribe); see also Michael Colello, Shinnecock Trial Begins in Spring,
THE EAST HAMPTON INDEPENDENT (Jan. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.shinnecocknation.com/news/news75.aspx (last visited March 22, 2004) (noting a trial
may decide whether the tribe should be granted federal recognition status).
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See Lambert, supra n. 41.
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See Powell, supra n. 36; see also Nation in Brief, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 16, 2005, at A30

(noting the tribe is “seeking billions of dollars for 150 years’ worth of back rent on land it inhabited
for 12,000 years in New York state in one of the largest lawsuits of its kind”).
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The conclusion that state recognized tribes such as the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe and the
Shinnecock Indian Nation may engage in gaming under state law is built from traditional theories
of tribal political rights and the constitutional sovereignty of the states which recognize them. Our
conclusion is based on five points, explained in this Section III:
1) While the federal government generally has jurisdiction over tribal practices that impact
non-tribal populations, gaming is a “vice activity,” a private liberty right regulated pursuant to state
authority under the 10th Amendment. “Vice activities” such as gaming fall within the constitutional
purview of state authority in the federalist system, and so only where the federal government has
preempted the field will the regulation of gaming fall under federal authority.
2) State recognized tribes are sovereign governments with limited but inherent sovereign
powers, including the right to conduct gaming activities, except as regulated as a “vice activity” by
the state or as preempted by the federal government. Alternatively stated, state tribes enjoy the
same private liberty rights to conduct gaming as other state citizens, subject to state or federal
regulation.
3) According to a growing line of federal case law, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(“IGRA”)

48

only preempts the field of gaming by federally recognized tribes on federal “Indian

land.” Gaming by state tribes, by other state-authorized parties, and even by federally-recognized
tribes that is not conducted on federal “Indian lands,” is not reached by IGRA. Thus gaming by a
state tribe on state-dominion land, such as a state Indian reservation, remains within the
constitutional purview of state authority. As a result, state-recognized tribes may conduct gaming
activities pursuant to state law.

48

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.
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4) Gaming by state-recognized tribes does not violate equal protection laws that forbid state
governments from discriminating in favor of one racial group, because like federal tribes, state
tribes are political entities and not racially-defined.
5) Significant policy arguments, consistent with IGRA policies to support the economic
well-being of federal tribes, also support gaming by state-recognized tribes.
Opponents of state tribal gaming may argue that 1) federal law preempts the field of Indian
gaming in its entirety, whether or not the federal government recognizes the Indian tribe in
question; 2) federal law only permits gaming by federally recognized tribes, and state-recognized
tribes have no inherent right to conduct gaming in the absence of federal authority granting gaming
rights; and 3) allowing state recognized tribes to conduct gaming to the exclusion of the general
population violates equal protection mandates, by granting a “race-based” preference to a Native
American racial or ethnic group.49
As explained below, while federal law does preempt the field of tribal gaming by federallyrecognized tribes – those tribes that the federal government recognizes as subjugated tribal
sovereigns and whose gaming IGRA was designed to regulate and foster -- federal law does not
preempt gaming by state-recognized tribes. Additionally, gaming by state recognized tribes does
not violate equal protection guarantees, because such gaming is permissibly based on a staterecognized tribe’s status as a state-recognized sovereign government – not the race or ethnicity of
the tribe or its individual members. As a result, states and the tribal sovereigns they recognize have
the right to enter into mutually beneficial agreements to allow for tribal gaming in accordance with
state law.

49

These arguments are those which have been raised during the authors’ work advocating on behalf

of state-recognized tribes.
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A.

The Regulation of Gaming is Generally a State Power
To understand “who has the right to do what,” it is important to understand the layers of

state, tribal, and federal jurisdiction upon which current tribal gaming rights are built.
External tribal affairs – those which extend beyond tribes’ internal self-governing – are
generally subject only to federal jurisdiction.50 Consequently, states usually have no power to
regulate activities which implicate tribes, without Congress’ express consent. It has been argued
that this precludes states and state-recognized tribes from entering into gaming agreements, since
Congress has not expressly provided for state tribal gaming agreements. However, this view may be
too simplistic, and may place too severe a limit on state and tribal rights.
States have constitutional authority to regulate “vice activities” conducted on state land
pursuant to powers reserved by the United States Constitution’s 10th Amendment.51 At the heart of
this is a state’s power to regulate all forms of gambling that have not been expressly prohibited by
the federal government. This state power has been repeatedly recognized.52 As recently stated by

50

Please see Section III(B) for a discussion of the relationship between tribes and the federal

government.
51

According to the 10th Amendment, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.” U.S. CONST. amend X.
52

See, e.g., Ah Sin v. Whitman, 198 U.S. 500, 505-506 (1905) (“[t]he suppression of gambling is

concededly within the police powers of a state, and legislation prohibiting it, or acts which may
tend to or facilitate it, will not be interfered with by the court unless such legislation by a 'clear,
unmistakable infringement of rights secured [sic] by the fundamental law”); People v. Sullivan, 60
Cal. App. 539 (4th Dist. 1943) (“[t]he Supreme Court of the United States recognizes the right of the
State to prohibit or regulate gambling and other acts which may affect public morals”); Maske v.
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the Ninth Circuit, “circuits … have, by and large, held that the regulation of gambling lies at the
heart of the state’s police power.”53
The first layer of our analysis, then, recognizes that any commercial or tribal gaming
conducted within state borders (as opposed to the borders of a federal Indian reservation) would be
a “vice activity” generally regulated under state, and not federal, jurisdiction. One Eighth Circuit
case recognized this power reserved to the states even applies to Indian gaming, if such gaming is
conducted outside a federal Indian reservation, and on land subject to state dominion.54 As we
explain below, the states’ federalist authority to regulate vice activities extends not just to gaming
by private parties operating on lands under state dominion, but to Indian tribes recognized by the
state and operating on a state Indian reservation or on other state lands.

CONCLUSION ONE: Gaming is a “vice activity,” a private liberty right regulated pursuant to state
authority under the 10th Amendment. “Vice activities” such as gaming fall within the constitutional
purview of state authority in the federalist system, and so gaming conduct will fall under federal
authority only where the federal government has expressly preempted the field.

State, 1 Mo. 452, *5 (1824) (“[i]t certainly will not be denied, that, under our federal system, each
state has a right to regulate its own internal policy, on all subjects, when they are not limited by the
Constitution of the United States”).
53

Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 737 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter

Artichoke Joe’s II].
54

See State ex rel Nixon v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that IGRA

does not preempt all forms of tribal gaming, including off-reservation internet gaming conducted by
an Indian tribe).
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B.

Tribes are Sovereign Governments with Inherent Rights Including the Right to Game,

Except as Preempted by the Federal Government
Sovereign tribes generally have the power to regulate and engage in gaming within their
borders, except as that right has been expressly preempted by the federal government.55 The
parameters of tribal jurisdiction over gaming activities, that is, the authority to conduct gaming
activities unless otherwise prohibited by positive enactment, is the next layer of analysis. In
particular, we must determine what gaming rights state tribes enjoy, absent federal preemption.
To do so, we begin by examining the powers of a sovereign tribe, whether or not it is
federally acknowledged. Sovereignty is one of the most powerful concepts in Indian life and
government, as well as Indian law. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “sovereign” as “[a] person,
body or state vested with independent and supreme authority.” 56 The dictionary further defines the
term “sovereign state” as “[a] state that possesses an independent existence, being complete in
itself, without being merely part of a larger whole to whose government it is a subject.”57 A recent
law review article describes sovereignty as “supreme legal authority.”58 While these definitions
suggest that tribal sovereigns, like national sovereigns, should be able to do whatever they want
within their borders, a tribe’s sovereign relationship with the United States is more complex.
The United States holds dominion over all Indian tribes within its borders, because unlike
sovereign nations, Indian tribes were conquered by the United States. At some point, directly or
indirectly, all Indian tribes were subjugated by force of arms. As a result, as noted by the
55

See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 446, at 5-6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075-3076.
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BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (7th ed. 1999).

57

Id.
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Peter d’Errico, Sovereignty: A Brief History in the Context of U.S. “Indian Law,”

http://www.umass.edu/legal/derrico/sovereignty.html (last visited March 31, 2004).
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preeminent tribal scholar Felix S. Cohen, tribal authority is not supreme, because tribal authority
can be limited by federal law.59
The next layer of our analysis must ask, then, in what ways has tribal sovereignty been
subordinated by the federal government, and in what ways is that authority still supreme? What
sovereign powers still exist, and which have been extinguished? The answers do not come from the
literal language of the United States Constitution. The Constitution mentions Indian tribes only
twice, once to exclude Indians from the per capita assessments used for attributing representatives
and tax dollars,60 and once to include commerce with Indian tribes within the federal Commerce
Power.61 Rather, traditional and time-honored concepts of a limited tribal sovereignty arise from
judicial interpretations of constitutional principles and principles of common law.
Judicial opinions repeatedly recognize the right of subordinate tribal sovereigns to govern
their internal affairs. The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged that an Indian tribe
possesses an inherent sovereign right to tribal self-government in an 1832 case involving the
Cherokee Nation, Worcester v. Georgia.62 The Court held that the Cherokee Tribe possessed
inherent or self-evident powers as the supreme governmental authority over its members, but that
authority was necessarily limited by the Cherokee Nation’s “dependency” on the United States.
The Supreme Court found an historic harmony in the relationship between the tribe and the federal
government, not dissimilar to the federalist model and its balancing of state and federal powers.
Worcester recognized that sovereign powers of an Indian tribe were self-evident, arising from an
Indian tribe’s original status as a self-governing sovereign. Its sovereign powers were not granted
59

See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 123 (1945) (emphasis added).
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See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

62

31 U.S. 515, 581 (1832).
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to it by external powers such as the federal government, or by the act of federal recognition, but
were part natural law and part historical. Harmonizing with this chord of subjugated sovereignty,
the Supreme Court found federal law formed a natural limitation to an Indian tribe’s sphere of
authority, by merit of its subjugation. The independent sovereign was now conquered, but still
possessed those natural and historical powers of sovereignty which the conqueror had not
confiscated. Over the next 170 years, additional judicial interpretations coalesced this notion of
tribal sovereignty into three foundational principles:

The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is
marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe
[p]ossesses, in the first [i]nstance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2)
Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States
and, in substance, terminates the external [p]owers of sovereignty of the tribe,
e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself
affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its [p]owers of local selfgovernment. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by
express legislation of Congress, but save as thus expressly qualified, full powers
of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted
organs of government.63

Thus, tribes have authority to do what they want on their tribal lands, including conduct gaming,
except where those rights have been expressly subordinated to an active federal power. “[T]reaties
and statutes of Congress have been looked to by the courts as limitations upon original tribal powers
… this is but an application of the general principle that ‘[I]t is only by positive enactments, even in
the case of conquered and subdued nations, that their laws are changed by the conqueror.’”64
Ultimately, the federal government, when it subordinated tribes directly or indirectly, only
took certain rights and left other “sovereign rights” intact. In this sense, as one of the many beauties
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Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 123 (1945) (emphasis added).
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Id. at 122 (partially quoting Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 51 (1845)).
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of the federalist system, tribal sovereigns are comparable to the 50 state sovereigns, whose inherent
powers are reserved by the 10th Amendment. Judicial opinions have created a protective penumbra
of case law around the notion of inherent, natural, historical or self-evident tribal sovereignty,
albeit one more permeable to active federal enactment than state powers. Accordingly, Indian tribes
today remain self-governed entities that retain all powers of governance, including the power to
conduct or permit gaming activities within their sphere of operation, that have not been expressly
preempted by Congress. Thus, gaming activities by Indian tribes fall within the limited sphere of
supreme tribal authority, unless otherwise prohibited by a positive federal enactment.65
The next layer of the analysis, then, must investigate whether this subordinate sovereign
status applies equally to both federal and state tribes. In other words, while federal case law usually
addresses the limited sovereign powers of Indian tribes that the federal government acknowledges,
does it also protect Indian tribes that are recognized only by state governments? The answer must
be yes. State tribes and federal tribes were both subjugated, directly or indirectly, by force of arms.
Both were true sovereigns prior to that subjugation. Applying the three principles above, (1) a state
tribe (like a federal tribe) initially possessed all the powers of any sovereign state; (2) conquest
rendered the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States, (3) making the state tribe’s
powers subject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but except as
expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty must still be vested in the state tribes and
their duly constituted organs of government. Certainly in the case of the Gabrielino-Tongva, whose
1851 treaty was signed but never ratified, their inherent sovereignty was recognized by at least one
President, helping to establish that the United States government acknowledged them as a bona fide
tribe at one time.
65

In this article, we do not consider the related issue of whether either state or federal tribes possess

the right to conduct gaming without a state compact.
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None of the three principles above suggest that federal recognition is a prerequisite to a
tribe’s inherent sovereignty.66 Federal acknowledgment is one important way that the superior
federal power has exercised its legislative power, but nothing in the Indian tribe’s lack of federal
status appears to dissolve this inherent, self-evident, natural and historical authority. This argument
garners additional support from the preeminent tribal scholar, Felix S. Cohen: “From the earliest
years of the Republic the Indian tribes have been recognized as ‘distinct, independent, political
communities,’ and, as such, qualified to exercise powers of self-government, not by virtue of any
delegation of powers from the Federal Government, but rather by reason of their inherent tribal
sovereignty.”

67

Since such powers are not dependent on the federal government for their existence,

state tribes such as the Gabrielinos and Shinnecocks must still be sovereign, irrespective of federal
recognition. Treaties and legislation merely confirm sovereign status – they do not grant it. Federal
recognition, as the name implies, is a gestalt reflection of the inherent power of state tribes; federal
acknowledgement is not its creation, it is not its source.

Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of
decisions ... is the principle that those powers which are lawfully vested in
an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express
acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished. Each Indian tribe begins its
relationship with the Federal Government as a sovereign power,
recognized as such in treaty and legislation.68
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But see, e.g., New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)

(suggesting that the BIA is in the best position to determine whether a tribe is, in fact, sovereign).
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Id. at 122 (1945) (emphasis added).
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Id.
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Ultimately, then, since tribal sovereignty is inherent, self-evident, natural and historical, it is
independent of the sanction of federal law, and continues to exist even in the absence of federal
69

recognition.

Because state recognized tribes were subjugated just like federally recognized tribes,

state recognized tribes must retain the same sovereign rights as those which are federally
recognized. As demonstrated above, the inherent sovereign power includes the power to conduct
vice activities such as gaming, except where the federal government has affirmatively provided
otherwise. And for state tribes, within that sphere of tribal authority must lie the power to enter into
an agreement with the state sovereign that recognizes the tribe, absent an express federal prohibition
otherwise. As explained below, while IGRA was enacted by the federal government to place
express limits on the gaming activities of federal tribes, federal law has not so limited this sovereign
powers of state tribes.

CONCLUSION TWO: 2) State recognized tribes are sovereign governments with limited but
inherent sovereign powers, including the right to conduct gaming activities, except as regulated as a
“vice activity” by the state or preempted by the federal government.

C.

The Federal Government Has Only Preempted the Field of Gaming By Federally

Recognized Tribes, Not Gaming by State Citizens, State Corporations or State-Recognized Tribes

69

But see Carruthers v. Flaum, 365 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that because the

Unkechaug tribe is only state recognized, and not federally recognized, the tribe is not sovereign).
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The next layer of analysis addresses federal preemption. If state tribes, like federal tribes,
hold inherent, self-evident, natural or historical sovereign powers to conduct gaming, we must look
to where federal enactments limit tribal and state sovereignty.70
Preemption is “[t]he principle … that a federal law can supersede or supplant any
inconsistent state law or regulation.”71 There are two federal acts that directly apply to federal
tribes and so might be argued to preempt gaming by a state tribe: the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (“IGRA”)72 and the federal Johnson Act.73 As explained below, neither act applies to state
tribes. Therefore neither act preempts gaming by a state tribe pursuant to a compact with its
respective state.
1.

The Cabazon Case
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided California v. Cabazon Band of Mission

Indians,74which led to the creation of IGRA, and explained how preemption works in an Indian
gaming setting. The Cabazon case concerned several federally recognized California tribes that
were running bingo operations, even though California law prohibited such a “vice activity” within
state borders. No federal enactment prevented gaming on federal Indian reservations, and the tribes
were frustrated at the state’s insistence that state law applied to make gaming conducted on federal

70

The related question of where a state tribe may conduct gaming activities is not broached. We

assume that the state tribe will choose to conduct gaming activities with the express agreement of
the state which recognizes it.
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BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (7th ed. 1999).

72

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.
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15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178.
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480 U.S. 202, 222 (1987).
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reservations unlawful.75 The tribes argued that they had the sovereign power to conduct gaming on
their sovereign lands, which were under federal and not state control; California argued the tribes’
bingo operations illegally conflicted with the state’s anti-gaming laws.76
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately found in favor of the tribes,77 explaining that state law
only applies on federal Indian reservations in certain circumstances.

[T]ribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal
Government, not the States. … It is clear, however, that state laws may be applied
to tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided.78

The Court concluded that gaming fell within the limited sphere of tribal sovereignty, and no
positive federal enactments applied to limit the scope of Indian gaming. California’s gaming laws
could only be applied on lands under the dominion of California, not on federal Indian lands.79
The Cabazon opinion also looked to see whether the state’s jurisdiction over gaming had
been preempted by federal law. It noted that “state authority is preempted … if it interferes or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at
stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.”80 The court weighed the federal and
tribal interests in encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development and found that they
were complimentary. However, the state’s interest in regulating tribal gaming, illustrated by
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Id. at 204-206.
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Id. at 207.
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See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207-212.
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Id. at 216.
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California’s purported purpose to prevent organized crime from infiltrating tribal gaming
operations, conflicted with federal and tribal interests. Because the federal interest in furthering
tribes’ economic well-being was paramount, the state law was preempted. Allowing state
regulation to intrude, in this case, would be inconsistent with tribal and federal interests in tribal
self-sufficiency, and thus was impermissible.81
Ultimately, Cabazon left two lasting contributions to the long line of judicial interpretations
delimiting tribal sovereignty. First, it affirmed that in the absence of a positive federal enactment
that says otherwise, tribal governments are the supreme authority to conduct and regulate gaming on
Indian lands under their jurisdiction. Cabazon thus falls in line with traditional notions of tribal
sovereignty as an inherent, self-evident, natural and historical power possessed by Indian tribes but
limited by federal enactment. And second, Cabazon set forth a preemption analysis applicable to
tribal gaming, becoming the first of several cases to apply federal preemption analysis to tribal
gaming as a nexus where tribal, federal and state jurisdictions intersect.
2.

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (“IGRA”)
After the Cabazon case was published, the absence of state authority on federal Indian

reservations terrified and infuriated California and other states. In many cases, federal Indian
reservations were within easy driving distance of major metropolitan areas. State anti-gaming laws
now had big, geographic holes in which desperately poor Indian tribes and entrepreneurial casino
developers might develop casinos to generate large sums of cash to the exclusion of others. In
response to state outcry over the nearly instantaneous growth of unregulated Indian gaming on
federal Indian lands, in 1988 Congress established IGRA82 to expressly “grant[] states some role in
the regulation of Indian gaming.”83
81

Id. at 216-222.

82

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.
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With IGRA, Congress asserted its dormant federal powers over tribal sovereigns, and
established the first formal non-Indian regulation of Indian casinos. IGRA organized tribal gaming
into three classes, each of which became subject to different degrees of regulation. It delegated a
major role to state jurisdiction through the requirement of a state tribal compact to engage in the
highest class of gaming. Class I gaming, which primarily includes traditional Indian games,84 is
exempt from state and federal oversight, and remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of tribes.85
Class II gaming consists of bingo and non-electronic card games,86 and is subject to IGRA and
tribal jurisdiction.87 Class III gaming, which includes the use of highly lucrative slot machines, may
only be conducted by a tribe if the State allows such gaming within its borders and a tribal gaming
agreement (or “compact”) is entered into with the state.88
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Artichoke Joe’s II, 353 F.3d at 715. According to the Ninth Circuit, “IGRA was Congress’

compromise solution to the difficult questions involving Indian gaming. The Act was passed in
order to provide ‘a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency and strong tribal governments. …’ IGRA
is an example of ‘cooperative federalism’ in that it seeks to balance the competing sovereign
interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes, by giving each a role in
the regulatory scheme.” Artichoke Joe’s II, 353 F.3d at 715 (quoting Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 216
F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2002) [hereinafter Artichoke Joe’s I]).
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Some 354 Indian casinos, all run by federally recognized tribes, are now operating under the
IGRA framework, pursuant to compacts negotiated by the governors of 28 states.89
3.

IGRA Does Not Preempt State Tribal Gaming Because IGRA Does Not Apply to State

Recognized Tribes
While IGRA explicitly preempts the state regulation of gaming by federal tribes on federal
Indian reservations, IGRA does not preempt gaming by state tribes on state-dominion lands, as
explained below.90 Accordingly, we posit that states are free to reach gaming agreements with state
89

See National Indian Gaming Association Library & Resource Center Website, http://

http://www.indiangaming.org/library/indian-gaming-facts/index.shtml (last visited June 18, 2005).
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See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 466, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075 (noting in its

discussion of IGRA that “today, tribal governments retain all rights that were not expressly
preempted”). In a painstakingly researched article that scrutinizes the origins of the federal
government’s power over Native Americans, scholar Mark Savage posits the novel theory that the
United States Constitution never granted the federal government plenary power (and therefore
preemptive power) over even federally recognized tribes. In his article, he argues that “[t]he United
States—its President, its Congress, and its Supreme Court—can exercise no power over Native
Americans unless the Constitution grants it. Examination of the text of the Constitution, the
intentions of the Framers, contemporary notions about sovereignty, the records of the Continental
Congress, and contemporary treaties with Native American nations makes it clear that the
Constitution has never granted to the United States a plenary power over Native Americans.” Mark
Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 57, 115-116 (1991). Consequently, he argues that “[t]wo hundred years of decisions by the
Supreme Court and legislation by Congress and the President lack constitutional authority.” Id. at
60. Although years of precedent ignoring this history have rendered his position moot, as advocated
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tribes to pursue gaming under state law and on state-dominion lands, such as a state Indian
reservation. Ultimately, state tribal gaming on state-dominion lands is not preempted by IGRA for
not just one, but two reasons:
(1) Gaming by state tribes falls outside IGRA’s field of preemption, which only covers
gaming by federally-recognized tribal sovereigns on federal Indian lands, and
(2) even if gaming by state-recognized tribes falls within IGRA’s parameters, state
jurisdiction is compatible with IGRA itself. Thus, even assuming arguendo that IGRA did preempt
the field of gaming for all Indian tribes on all lands, state and tribal regulation of gaming by staterecognized tribal sovereigns must still be allowed.
a.

State-Authorized Gaming by A State Tribe on State-Dominion Lands Falls Outside

IGRA’s Preemptive Field
Traditional preemption analysis has two steps. First, any potentially relevant federal
legislation is analyzed to see what “field” is preempted. If the state or tribal activity falls outside the
preempted field, the activity stands. If the target activity falls inside of the preempted field, the
second step is to determine whether state or tribal regulation conflicts or interferes with federal
regulation. If not, then such regulation may coexist side-by-side with federal regulation, and again
the activity stands.91
by Savage this argument may still be used “to challenge exercises of state and federal power over
Native Americans and their lands and thus to accomplish the ends of self-determination and selfgovernment.” Id. at 118.
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See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Company v. Detroit, 362 US 440, 443 (1960) (“[i]n determining

whether state regulation has been pre-empted by federal action, 'the intent to supersede the exercise
by the state of its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be
inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a
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So what field of gaming does IGRA preempt? To begin with the obvious, IGRA does not
preempt state authority over non-Indian “vice activities.” States retain their inherent constitutional
police power over vice activities within their borders, including exclusive authority over non-tribal
gaming on state-dominion lands. For example, Nevada and New Jersey continue to allow extensive
gaming activities in Las Vegas and Atlantic City under their respective state laws. Such gaming lies
outside IGRA’s preemptive field. California allows more limited gaming activities by card rooms
and horse racing tracks on state lands under California law.92 In addition, California itself runs a
state lottery and permits gaming for non-profit purposes.
IGRA, by its own terms, applies only to gaming conducted on federal “Indian lands” 93 and
by federal “Indian tribes.” 94 Neither term appears to reach state-recognized tribes or gaming under
state law on state-dominion lands.
IGRA defines “Indian lands” in two parts. “Indian lands” are, first, “any lands title to which
is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual, or held by
any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over
which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power,”95 and second, “all lands within the limits of
any [federal] Indian reservation.”96
limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress, fairly
interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state”).
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The first part of the definition explicitly references a federal jurisdiction requirement by
limiting “Indian lands” to those held in trust or subject to restriction by the United States. However,
the lands of state-recognized tribes are generally not held in trust by the federal government, as they
are often only state recognized.97 Absent federal acknowledgment of an Indian tribe, one is hardpressed to argue that any state Indian reservation or other gaming facility would be under federal
restriction.
The second part of the definition, “Indian reservation,” is a term that generally refers to
federal and not state reservations. As explained in Enlow v. Bevenue, “[g]radually the term [“Indian
reservation”] has come to describe ‘federally-protected Indian tribal lands,’ meaning those lands
98
which Congress has set apart for tribal and federal jurisdiction.” Under IGRA, a “reservation” is

likely one defined by the Secretary of the Interior and therefore federally recognized: For example,
gaming is permitted on lands acquired after October 17, 1988 when “lands are taken into trust as
part of … the initial reservation of an Indian tribe acknowledged by the Secretary under the Federal
acknowledgment process, or the restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal
recognition.”99 Also, “[a]n Indian reservation is a reservation of land that Congress has withdrawn
from the public domain for a variety of purposes, including Indian autonomy.”100 Therefore, IGRA
probably only reaches Indian gaming on federally supervised Indian land.
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As a result, gaming on state-dominion lands, including a state Indian reservation, likely falls
outside IGRA. A similar conclusion was reached in the 2005 case, Nixon v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe.101
In Nixon, a federal Indian tribe conducting gaming on federal lands decided to undertake a new
gaming activity, internet gaming, but from a location off reservation and within the state-dominion
lands of Missouri. The State sued to stop internet gaming by the tribe, but the tribe argued that
IGRA preempted state law, and prevented Missouri from stopping the tribe’s gaming activity. The
Court found IGRA did not preempt state jurisdiction, even though the tribe was federally
recognized and did conduct other gaming under IGRA, because the internet gaming was conducted
outside federal “Indian lands”:
IGRA established a comprehensive regulatory regime for tribal gaming activities
on Indian lands. Both the language of the statute and its legislative history refer
only to gaming on Indian lands….Once a tribe leaves its own lands and conducts
gambling activities on state lands, nothing in the IGRA suggests that Congress
intended to preempt the State's historic right to regulate this controversial class of
economic activities. For example, if the State of Missouri sought an injunction
against the Tribe conducting an internet lottery from a Kansas City hotel room, or
a floating crap game in the streets of St. Louis, the IGRA should not completely
preempt such a law enforcement action simply because the injunction might
"interfere with tribal governance of gaming.” If the Tribe's lottery is being
conducted on its lands, then the IGRA completely preempts the State's attempt to
regulate or prohibit. But if the lottery is being conducted on Missouri lands, the
IGRA does not preempt the state law claims--indeed, it does not even appear to
102
provide a federal defense--and the case must be remanded to state court.
Pursuant to the 10th amendment and the inherent state authority to regulate “vice activities,”
gaming by state citizens, state corporations, state tribes and even federal tribes on lands other than
federal “Indian lands” can be conducted under state law. And if so allowed by state law, the state
law itself is not preempted by federal regulation under IGRA.
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Further, just as IGRA does not reach beyond federal “Indian lands” to lands under state
jurisdiction, IGRA does not reach beyond federally recognized tribes to state recognized tribes. By
its own terms, IGRA only regulates gaming by an “Indian tribe,” a term defined within IGRA as
“any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians which … is
recognized as eligible by the Secretary for the special programs and services provided by the United
States to Indians because of their status as Indians, and … is recognized [by the Secretary] as
possessing powers of self-government.”103 This Secretary of the Interior recognition requirement
limits the definition’s scope to those tribes which have attained formal federal acknowledgment.
Case law confirms that IGRA only applies to federal tribes. As explained in First American
Casino Corporation v. Eastern Pequot Nation:

IGRA does not apply [to the parties’ agreement] because defendant has not attained
formal federal recognition and therefore is not an ‘Indian tribe’ within the meaning
of IGRA. Unless and until defendant obtains federal acknowledgment, its activities
are not regulated by IGRA. … Because IGRA’s text unambiguously limits its scope
to gaming by tribes that have attained federal recognition, [IGRA] does not apply to
defendant’s gaming-related activities.104

First American Casino Corporation was a breach of contract case involving a gaming
management contract that had been entered into by the defendant Eastern Pequots, a state tribe that
wanted to conduct gaming under IGRA but had never received formal federal recognition.105 The
plaintiff argued that the defendant tribe had breached the agreement by negotiating with third
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parties to find someone other than the plaintiff to finance, develop and manage the tribe’s future
casino.106 The defendant tribe removed the case to federal court on the theory that the federal court
had subject matter jurisdiction, since the management contract necessarily implicated IGRA.107
The court ultimately disagreed and held there was no subject matter jurisdiction: Because the
Eastern Pequots had not yet received formal federal recognition, IGRA did not apply.108
The court also rejected the Eastern Pequot’s additional argument that IGRA completely
preempted the field of tribal gaming, including gaming by a state tribe. The Court stated:

The issue here is whether defendant has shown a clear congressional
intent in IGRA to completely preempt plaintiff's state law claims. Two
cases from the Eighth Circuit indicate that IGRA completely preempts
the field of regulating Indian gaming when the statute applies. …
However, both cases also indicate that IGRA has no such power if it
does not apply. … Because IGRA's text unambiguously limits its
scope to gaming by tribes that have attained federal recognition, the
statute does not apply to defendant's gaming-related activities.
Accordingly, plaintiff's state law claims are not completely preempted
by IGRA. 109
The court explained that the Supreme Court has found complete preemption in only three areas, and
Indian gaming is not one of them.110
Other cases support the thesis that IGRA does not reach gaming by state tribes. In 2003, the
Ninth Circuit found “[t]he operative terms of IGRA expressly relate only to tribes, not to individual
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Indians. … Indeed … only federally recognized tribes are covered.”111 It also noted, “IGRA pertains
to Indian lands and to tribal self-government and [the] tribal status of federally recognized
tribes.”112 Thus, gaming by a state tribe that is not federally recognized would not lie within
IGRA’s preemptive field. Accordingly, such gaming would remain the purview of the state and its
recognized tribes. Gaming by a state tribe on state-dominion land remains within the constitutional
purview of state and tribal authority, and state-recognized tribes may conduct gaming activities
pursuant to a gaming agreement with the state that recognizes them.
b.

Even if Gaming By State Recognized Tribes Falls Within IGRA’s Preemptive Field,

Gaming By State Tribes Under State Law Should Still Be Allowable Since Such Gaming Would
Not Conflict with IGRA’s Underlying Purposes
The body of case law described above reaches only the first step of the preemption analysis.
Since no case has expressly held that gaming by state tribes falls outside IGRA’s preemptive field,
however, it is important to turn to the second step, which looks at whether activities that fall within
the preempted field are, in fact, preempted. Assuming for the sake of argument that gaming by state
tribes lies within the preempted field, a further determination must be made as to whether the state
or tribal regulation that would authorize the state tribal gaming, conflicts with IGRA. If not, then
such regulation may still coexist side-by-side with IGRA, and would not be preempted by IGRA.
Several cases involving Indian gaming analyze when an assertion of state authority would be
consistent with, and therefore not preempted by, IGRA.113 For example, in Hotel Employees &
Restaurant Employees International Union v. Davis, another Indian gaming case, the California
111
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Supreme Court stressed that IGRA does not exempt gaming on Indian lands from state regulatory
laws and therefore does not preempt state laws regulating gaming, even by federal tribes on federal
Indian reservations.

IGRA does not exempt gambling on Indian lands from state regulatory laws.
Indeed, section 23 of IGRA provides that “for purposes of Federal law, all State
laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation or prohibition of gambling … shall
apply in Indian country.114

In Hotel Employees, a number of parties, including a labor union, sought to invalidate
Proposition 5, the Tribal Government and Economic Self-Sufficiency Act of 1998. Proposition 5
was a voter initiative passed to authorize Las Vegas-style gaming in tribal casinos. The union
argued that the proposition conflicted with state and federal law, and therefore was invalid. The
California Supreme Court agreed, explaining the proposition was invalid because it authorized
forms of gaming that the California constitution prohibited. The tribes countered that, regardless of
the California Constitution, IGRA preempted the regulation of Indian gaming by California and
therefore preempted the state constitution’s anti-casino provision.115 The California Supreme Court
disagreed and found that IGRA itself preserved state authority: IGRA’s provisions limited its own
preemptive reach by requiring that Indian gaming comply with state gambling laws. The court noted
only one exception to that general rule – that portion of IGRA which permits Class III gaming under
tribal/state compacts.116
Thus, even IGRA’s own language appears to limit its power to exclude state law from
regulating vice activities on state-dominion land, whether the gaming is conducted by state citizens,
114
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state corporations or state tribes. IGRA itself establishes that state gambling laws may apply within
the preempted field of gaming on federal “Indian lands,” unless the state’s regulatory scheme
conflicts or interferes with a tribal-state compact under IGRA.117 And even then, according to
IGRA’s own language, the parameters of gaming permitted by that compact must be compatible
with state law. A priori, state gambling laws must operate freely on non-federal lands under state
control. And states should be able to authorize gaming on such lands by non-federal tribes, just as
they could authorize such gaming for any other party.
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Hull118 further illuminates when the
assertion of state authority in an Indian gaming context does not conflict with, and therefore is not
preempted by, IGRA. In Salt River, the court considered an Arizona proposition mandating the
terms of a tribal gaming agreement, irrespective of what the Governor or Legislature might wish to
negotiate. Arizona’s Governor argued that the proposition was preempted by IGRA, which has
specific provisions regarding how compacts must be negotiated, but the Arizona proposition
removed the Governor’s IGRA-based authority to negotiate the terms of such compacts and so
directly conflicted with those provisions.119 The courtfound no such preemption, even though the
proposition clearly entered IGRA’s preemptive field.120 The court upheld the proposition as
compatible with IGRA, because the state could still negotiate compact terms; the proposition just
set a minimum for what the state could offer.121 The court stressed that the purpose of IGRA is “to
give Indian tribes a mechanism through which to force a reluctant state government to the
117
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bargaining table and require it to negotiate a compact in good faith.”122 Thus, even though the state
gaming proposition fell within the preempted field, its purpose was sufficiently consistent with
IGRA to be upheld, and not be preempted.
In light of Salt River, assuming arguendo that a state law authorizing a state tribe to conduct
gaming on state-dominion land was within IGRA’s preemptive field, the state law would not be
preempted so long as it was compatible with IGRA’s purpose. So what is IGRA’s purpose?
According to the California Supreme Court, the IGRA’s mission is to balance state interests in
regulating gaming within state borders, with federal interests in allowing federal tribes to operate
casinos on federal Indian reservations and support tribal economies.123 One way IGRA fulfills this
mission is by encouraging states to negotiate with tribes to create tribal gaming compacts to control
gaming within state borders.124 However, by agreeing to enter into a gaming compact with a state
tribe, a state would already be at the bargaining table, and thus IGRA would not be needed to
compel such negotiation.
Once again, this article addresses the situation of a state and state tribe that wish to engage
in gaming, not a state attempting to stop an Indian tribe from gaming, the latter of which IGRA was
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needed to address; the former already parallels IGRA’s interest in getting states and tribes to work
together.
State tribal gaming would also agree with at least one other purpose expressly stated in
IGRA – “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”125 By
allowing state tribes to generate much needed revenue through gaming agreements under state law,
such tribes would be able to further their tribe’s economic development and self-sufficiency, and
thereby strengthen their tribal governments. Ultimately, state interests in supporting the economic
development and self-sufficiency of a state tribal government are consistent with Congress’
interests in economic development and tribal self-sufficiency in federal Indian gaming.126 In
Cabazon, the Supreme Court noted the tribes’ and federal government’s interests in tribal economic
development, emphasizing their extreme importance: “The tribal games at present provide the sole
source of revenues for the operation of the tribal government and the provision of tribal services …
Self-determination and economic development are not within reach if the Tribes cannot raise
revenues and provide employment for their members.”127 Similarly, in Hotel Employees, the
California Supreme Court emphasized IGRA’s interest in “promot[ing] tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”128
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Here, it is also “tribal self-sufficiency and economic development” that are at stake. Since a
state compact with a state tribe apparently parallels the purposes underlying IGRA, such agreements
should not be preempted, even if IGRA occupies the field.
Ultimately, gaming by a state tribe on a state Indian reservation under state law could be
carefully tailored to allow state-recognized tribes the same economic development opportunities as
those provided by IGRA for federal tribes operating casinos on federal “Indian lands.” The state
laws might parallel IGRA’s provisions, the games allowed might parallel existing gaming at IGRAlicensed casinos, and the agreements between states and their recognized tribes might parallel
states’ existing gaming compacts with federal tribes. Such gaming could be strictly limited to staterecognized tribes on state-dominion lands, including existing or newly created state Indian
reservations.129 Thus, carefully tailored state law and state gaming compacts could be made
comparable to IGRA to avoid any conflicts with federal Indian gaming.
4.

State Tribal Gaming Is Also Not Preempted by the Federal Johnson Act
A second federal act that preempts some forms of tribal gaming is the Johnson Act, which

reads in relevant part: “It shall be unlawful to … sell, transport, possess, or use any gambling device
… within Indian country as defined in section 1151 of Title 18.” 130 The Act makes several means
of gambling, including the use of slot machines, illegal in “Indian country.”131
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Ultimately, the definition of “Indian country” limits the preemptive effect of the Johnson
Act in the same manner as the definition of “Indian lands” limits the preemptive effect of IGRA.
The Johnson Act does not apply to most state tribes because most state tribes’ lands are statedominion lands that simply do not qualify as “Indian Country.”
“Indian Country” is a term of art defined by federal statute:

Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term
“Indian country” … means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government … and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within
the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through
the same.132

First, under subsection (a) above, since state tribes’ lands are not under federal jurisdiction,
their state reservations would not qualify as a reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
government.
Second, under subsection (b) above, most state tribes’ lands would not qualify as “dependent
Indian communit[ies].” The United States Supreme Court, in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government,133 explained what was meant by “dependent Indian community”: “[“Dependent
Indian community”] refers to a limited category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor
allotments, and that satisfy two requirements—first, they must have been set aside by the Federal

not apply to state tribes, if the Johnson Act applies, it would present a barrier to a state recognized
tribe’s Class III gaming efforts.
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Government for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal
superintendence.”134
In Venetie, a tribe’s original reservation had been revoked and therefore could not satisfy a
federal set-aside requirement.135 With revocation, federal superintendence over the land had been
eliminated.136 Even the federal government providing the tribe with “desperately needed social
programs [could not] support a finding of Indian country.”137 In our case, where a state tribe would
conduct gaming on a state Indian reservation, a finding that the state Indian reservation qualified as
“Indian country” would be difficult. Most state tribes’ traditional reservations have been revoked
and most existing lands would not have been set aside by the federal government, as the tribes are
not federally recognized. Instead, it is often the state government that has recognized them and set
aside their tribal lands. For example, if the Gabrielino-Tongva tribe were to gain back its tribal
lands through state legislation, such a state Indian reservation would not automatically be subject to
federal superintendence. The Gabrielino’s reservation at San Sebastian was lost long ago and only
that land would come close to the requirement of “federal superintendence.” Thus, a new state
Indian reservation for the Gabrielinos would not qualify as a dependent Indian community, or as
“Indian country” under the Johnson Act.
Third, under subsection (c) above, most state tribes’ lands would not be “Indian allotments
… titles to which have not been extinguished.” An Indian allotment is land owned by an individual
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Indian that was parceled out of a larger federal reservation.138 Most allotments existed during the
first half of the 20th century following passage of the General Allotment Act or “Dawes Act;”139 as
explained above, the Act was part of a federal program designed to assimilate Indians into
mainstream western culture.140 Tribal lands were broken up into a series of individual “allotments”
that were then issued to individual tribal members who could live on or sell the land at will. This
program failed, however, because most tribal members – many of whom were cash poor - sold their
land to non-Indians for small sums of money that were quickly spent, and the act never made the
tribal members self-sufficient as originally planned. The Reorganization Act141 was passed by
Congress in 1934 to put an end to the allotment program.142 Since tribal title to most allotments was
extinguished during the first half of the twentieth century, however state Indian reservations would
not fall within this definition.
Thus, since both IGRA and the Johnson Act – the two primary federal acts that regulate
Indian gaming – do not apply to state tribes, it is unlikely the federal government has preempted the
field of gaming for all state tribes. General policy supports this argument: originally, the conflict
over whether tribes could conduct gaming was a state/tribal issue, not a federal one. The main
reason federal law became involved in gaming was to encourage states and tribes to “get along.”
138

See Indian Tribal Governments: FAQs Regarding Terminology, Internal Revenue Service

Website, http://www.irs.gov/govt/tries/article/0,,id=108431,00.html#A4 (last visited Aug. 12, 2004)
[hereinafter IRS Website].
139

An Act to Provide for the Allotment of Lands in Severalty to Indians on the Various Reservations

(General Allotment or Dawes Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-381, 24 Stat. 388-91 (1887).
140

See IRS Website, supra note 139.

141

Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934).

142

See IRS Website, supra note 139.

48

Where a state seeks to foster Indian gaming by a state tribe, rather than prohibit it to a federal tribe,
such acts are not needed, and were never intended to apply. Likewise, where gaming is permitted
on state-dominion lands rather than on federal Indian reservations, the application of such acts is
both unneeded and unintended.

CONCLUSION THREE: Gaming by state tribes, by other state-authorized parties, and even by
federally-recognized tribes that is not conducted on federal “Indian lands” is not reached by IGRA
or the Johnson Act. Thus gaming by a state tribe on state-dominion land, such as a state Indian
reservation, remains within the constitutional purview of state authority. As a result, staterecognized tribes may conduct gaming activities where acceptable under state law.

D.

Gaming by State-Recognized Tribes Does Not Violate Equal Protection
After federal preemption, the most significant argument raised by state tribal gaming

opponents is that Class III gaming by state tribes would violate equal protection. Opponents argue
that giving state tribes gaming rights not enjoyed by other state citizens or corporations would be
an unlawful racial preference that violates the 14th Amendment’s guarantee that all be treated
equally, that no one be denied “equal protection of the laws.”143
Analysis of federal precedents provides a strong counterargument. Today, most legislation
benefiting federal tribes does not violate equal protection. For example, IGRA and other federal
statutes have repeatedly withstood equal protection challenges even though they benefit Native
American tribes to the exclusion of other groups, because such discrimination is based upon a
political classification, the tribes’ governmental status, and not race. As shown below, the same
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argument protects state laws that allow gaming by state Indian tribes based upon their governmental
status.
1.

The Mancari Doctrine and Artichoke Joe’s
Morton v. Mancari144 is the seminal authority that explains when laws favoring American

Indians do not violate equal protection.145 In Mancari, the Supreme Court held that a BIA hiring
preference for Indians did not violate equal protection because “[t]he preference, as applied, [was]
granted to Indians not as discrete racial groups, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal
entities.”146 The Court reasoned that “[t]he preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group
consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This
operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the
preference is political rather than racial in nature.”147 With this statement, a “political versus racial”
distinction became the litmus test for whether rational basis should be applied to tribal-friendly
legislation, or whether such legislation should be reviewed with strict scrutiny. If a rational basis
test is applied, federal legislation helping federal tribes is usually found to complement
governmental objectives, and easily found constitutional; conversely, if strict scrutiny is applied,
such legislation is usually found unconstitutional. Thus, applicable cases tend to battle over
whether application of strict scrutiny or a rational basis test is most appropriate.
The tribal gaming jurisprudence that built on Mancari has followed the Mancari Court’s
approach. Mancari was recently applied by the Ninth Circuit in 2003 in perhaps the most important
144

417 U.S. 535 (1974).

145

See, e.g., Artichoke Joe’s II, 353 F.3d at 732 (recognizing Mancari as the starting point for Equal

Protection analysis).
146

Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554.

147

Id. at 554 n.24.

50

equal protection case addressing Indian gaming: Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v.
Norton. In Artichoke Joe’s, plaintiff card rooms and charities challenged the validity of the tribal
gaming compacts entered into between California and a large number of federally recognized Indian
tribes. Plaintiffs argued that allowing only tribes to operate Las Vegas style casinos to the exclusion
of non-tribal casino operators violated the latter’s equal protection rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments by making an impermissible race-based preference in favor of the tribes.148
The court applied Mancari to determine whether the tribal compacts represented a race-based
preference, or one that was political.149 Based on Mancari, the court found allowing tribal
governments to have a monopoly on Class III gaming was predicated on a political and not racial
designation, and therefore did not violate equal protection.
Ultimately, as declared in Artichoke Joe’s, a tribal gaming equal protection analysis

requires … answer[ing] two questions. First, [it must be decided] whether the
distinction between Indian and non-Indian gaming interests is a political or a
racial classification, so we can determine the proper level of deference that is
owed to the classification. Second, [it must be decided] whether, under the
applicable standard of review, legitimate state interests justify the grant to Indian
tribes of a monopoly on class III gaming.150

As explained below, gaming by state recognized tribes satisfies both tests.
2.

Application of Mancari and Artichoke Joe’s To Gaming By State-Recognized Tribes

a.

The Distinction Between Gaming by State Recognized Tribes Versus Non-Indian Gaming

Interests Represents a Political Classification
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State laws favoring gaming by state tribes should be subject to rational basis review and not
strict scrutiny, similarly to laws favoring federally recognized tribes. State tribes – like federal
tribes - are political entities and not racial groups: Similar to federal recognition, state recognition
“operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as Indians,” the Mancari test
for when a preference “is political rather than racial in nature.” Like federally recognized tribes,
state tribes must earn formal recognition by an independent government entity: in this case, the
state. Consequently, not all self-defined, non-federally recognized tribes would qualify. In fact,
most would not. Like federally recognized tribes, state-recognized tribes are subject to whatever
screening criteria states deem critical for recognizing a tribe. The only difference is that a state
government has recognized the tribe in lieu of the federal government.
Opponents nonetheless will argue that the rational basis standard advocated in Mancari was
dependent not so much on the “political versus racial” distinction, but on the fact of federal
recognition. And there is support for that argument in Mancari: “As long as the special treatment
can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians, such
legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Congress’ classification violates due
process.” However, it is not clear that Congress’ recognition was the primary determining line for
the Mancari court, which also stressed the importance of distinguishing political entities from
individual Native Americans. While the Court found that federally recognized tribes qualify as
political entities for purposes of applying the less rigorous rational basis scrutiny on the basis of
Congress’ recognition of their government status, that does not necessarily mean that the “political
versus racial” distinction can not be applied to other Indian groups to see if they might also qualify
as political entities. This approach especially makes sense considering that equal protection
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jurisprudence generally operates to avoid impermissible “race-based” classifications, and usually
has little to do with “Congress’ unique obligation[s].”
Opponents may also argue that because Mancari dealt only with a subset of the tribal
population –federally recognized tribes – its precedential value should be limited to that population.
However, Mancari does not have to be interpreted so narrowly; as noted in Arakaki v. Lingle,151 the
Mancari Court “did not have before it any question as to whether the Native Americans being given
the preference were from federally recognized Indian tribes.”152 Consequently, there was no reason
to specifically mention state recognized tribes – especially when state recognized tribes are a minor
and often overlooked subset of the Native American tribal population.
Ultimately, Mancari states principles that reach beyond federally-recognized tribes to
address the nature of tribal sovereignty itself. For example, the Mancari Court noted that a
preference reasonably related to a “legitimate, nonracially based goal … is the principal
characteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination.”153 This
suggests the court’s concern was truly with racial discrimination, and not with legislative attempts
to limit participation in a particular industry to federal tribes. Thus it is difficult to imply that the
court would use the strict scrutiny test only when faced with federally recognized tribes, but not
state-recognized tribes. Both are tribal sovereigns subjugated by the United States. Whether the
United States grants recognition or one of its federalist states grants recognition, a longstanding
tribe is nonetheless a “quasi-sovereign entity,” and not just a racial group.
Applying the “political versus racial” analysis to the state-recognized Gabrielino-Tongva or
Shinnecock tribes, there is a strong argument that formal state recognition of the tribes is
151
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recognition of a sovereign political community, not a specific racial group. Using the GabrielinoTongva as an example, the relevant racial classification would consist of a much larger group of
individuals, such as “Mission Indians,” “Shoshone Indians,” or “Native Americans.” These are
classifications which cross tribal government boundaries. In California, several different tribes
include members who can be classified as Mission Indians, as Shoshone Indians, or Native
American. Just as Asian-Americans of Japanese heritage (the racial and ethnic classifications) can
also be citizens of a particular state (the political or government classification), Native Americans
(the racial classification) may be citizens of a particular tribe (the government classification).
Similarly, the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe excludes many Mission and Shoshone Indians and certainly
most Native Americans. The character of the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe is political as much because
of its organizational attributes as a state-recognized sovereign, as its exclusion of other members of
the same racial group. All three of these factors work in the same direction: the Tribe’s external
recognition by California; the Tribe’s internal organization as a tribal sovereign government; and
the Tribe’s exclusivity independent of other members of the same racial group, all strongly suggest
the Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe is not a racially determined entity, but one that is politically defined.
While opponents argue that state recognition cannot stand in as a relevant political
classification because it is not as “formal” as federal recognition (in part because criteria for state
recognition vary dramatically from state to state), even the federal government has recognized that
states have the authority to officially recognize tribes. By extending some federal benefits to state
recognized tribes on the basis of their tribal classification as state recognized, the federal
government has legitimized state recognition, and thereby validated state recognition as a
classification. Examples of federal regulations that extend federal benefits to state tribes include
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Health and Human Services Block Grants;154 Administration of Food Stamp Programs on Indian
Reservations;155 Energy Conservation Grant Programs;156 and Native American Welfare Programs.157
These regulations presumably withstand equal protection scrutiny despite their inclusion of state
recognized tribes, further suggesting federal recognition is not necessary for tribal legislation to
survive an equal protection analysis. Additionally, while recognition by state governments may
deliver less in the way of concrete rights and obligations than federal recognition, state recognition
can be every bit as solemn. The thirteen states that have recognized non-federal Indian tribes have
used a variety of methods to do so. These range from the passage of joint resolutions (as in
California and Louisiana) to comprehensive statutory frameworks that grant significant substantive
rights (as in North Carolina).158
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Finally, state tribal gaming opponents may try to argue that rational basis review can only
be applied to federal laws that favor Indians, not to state laws that would be necessary to grant a
preference to state-recognized tribes to conduct gaming on a state Indian reservation.159
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,160 the Supreme Court
provided the first step toward disarming that argument, although the majority opinion limited its
own scope of decision. In Yakima, rational basis review was applied to a Washington state law
favoring federal Indian tribes; however, the court based its application of rational basis review on
the fact that a federal law (Public Law 280) had authorized extending that state law into Indian
country.161
But even without the involvement of any federal authority, the political classification
argument should survive when applied to state law. As established above, gaming is a vice activity
subject to the state’s police power to regulate gaming within its sovereign borders.162 As noted in
71A-7.1-71A-7 (recognizing North Carolina’s eight state tribes); see also Alexa Koenig and
Jonathan Stein, 2004 Survey of State-Recognized Tribes (2004) (on file with the authors).
159
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sovereign.
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Artichoke Joe’s, under the state’s police power, states have great leeway to grant monopolies and
not violate Equal Protection considerations: “Where there exists an appropriate connection to the
state’s police power, even the grant of a monopoly does not, in itself, offend equal protection
principles.”163 So long as state law grants this monopoly to a politically classified group, such as a
state tribe, and not a racially classified group, such as all Native Americans, the 14th Amendment
rational review standard should apply.
Holding otherwise, and denying rational basis review just because there is no federal
authority involved, takes an unnecessarily narrow view of equal protection jurisprudence. Several
preeminent scholars in the field of Indian law have similarly suggested that a federal connection is
not necessary to justify the application of rational basis review and thereby survive equal protection
scrutiny. As argued by Felix S. Cohen, “[T]he Supreme Court held long ago that the federal
relationship with tribes does not preclude protective state laws which do not infringe on federally
protected rights. … If Indians are a legitimate classification for protective federal laws, their status
is arguably the same for state laws of that character. Such state laws have long been assumed
valid.”164
gambling lies at the heart of the state’s police power’” (partially quoting Helton v. Hunt, 330 F.3d
th
242, 246 (4 Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967 (2003)).
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UCLA has also argued that state legislation can escape strict scrutiny, so long as that legislation
carries forward established federal policies – in this case, such policies would be tribal economic
development and self-sufficiency. While “[h]elping isolated individuals, without any perceptible
group impact, will not suffice,” she posits that equality based challenges to state legislation can be
surmounted so long as the state law “advance[s] group interests in self-determination, encompassing
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Ultimately, the only restriction on states appears to be that their preferred classification
(such as allowing Class III gaming by state recognized tribes, and not the general population) be
reasonable:

When the subject of legislation falls under the police powers of the
state, activities may be prohibited altogether, limited as to place and
location, or, where operation is permitted, may be regulated by rules of
conduct. These laws enacted under the police powers must be subject
to the restriction that the prohibition, limitation or regulation, must
apply to all alike who come within a reasonable classification of
persons or property. The fact that because of classification the statute
does not apply to every person alike is no valid objection to its
constitutionality, for classification itself presupposes inequality of
application and the courts may only inquire if the classification is
reasonable and founded upon some logical, natural, intrinsic or
constitutional distinction between people composing a class and others
not embraced within it.165
b.

Legitimate State Interests Justify Granting Federal and State Recognized Tribes a

Monopoly on Class III Gaming
Gaming by state recognized tribes on state-dominion land under state law also passes the
second half of the 14th Amendment analysis: whether legitimate state interests justify granting both
state and federal tribes a monopoly on Class III gaming. In Artichoke Joe’s, after determining that
rational basis review applied to the tribal-state compacts, the court concluded the tribal gaming
compacts survived equal protection analysis because legitimate state interests were rationally

the tribe’s economic, cultural and political advancement.” Carole Goldberg, American Indians and
“Preferential Treatment,” 49 UCLA L. REV. 943, 967 (2002).
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related to granting a Class III gaming monopoly to California’s federally recognized tribes.166 The
court found that the state had two legitimate interests in granting the monopoly: 1) an interest in
regulating gaming as a “vice activity,” and 2) promoting “cooperative relationships between the
tribes and the State by fostering tribal sovereignty and self-sufficiency.”167
Extending the Class III gaming monopoly from federally-recognized tribes to federal and
state tribes concords with both interests. As for the first, state tribal gaming could be permitted only
under a tribal-state compact, similar or identical to gaming compacts with federal tribes.
Accordingly, the state would be able to control the conditions under which such Class III gaming
would be conducted, and thus would have a hand in regulating state tribal gaming as a vice activity.
As in Artichoke Joe’s, limiting Class III gaming to a larger category that includes both federal and
state tribes would continue to be rationally related to the stated regulatory interest in “foster[ing]
California’s legitimate [state] sovereign interest in regulating the growth of Class III gaming in
California” and “limiting Class III gaming operations … [to] defend against the[ir] criminal
infiltration.”168
As for the second interest -- promoting cooperation with tribal sovereigns and fostering
tribal self-sufficiency -- extending the gaming monopoly to state tribes similarly helps California
enter “a new era of tribal-state cooperation in areas of mutual concern.”169 State tribes, like federal
tribes, faced some of the most brutal episodes of genocide, racism and government-sponsored abuse
in our Nation’s history – episodes which obliterated many tribes, and stripped the government
166
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classification from many others. Recognizing the legitimacy of state tribes would help repair the
same damage that was done to federal tribes, by reaching those state-recognized tribal sovereigns
that, by fluke of history, never gained federal acknowledgment. As with federally recognized tribes,
allowing state sovereigns to conduct Class III gaming operations would strengthen a “mutually
respectful government-to-government relationship that [serves] the mutual interests of the tribes and
the State,”170 by helping them build their economic and political foundations.
Artichoke Joe’s even suggests – albeit indirectly -- that gaming by state recognized tribes on
a state Indian reservation under state law could offer an even stronger case for allowing a Class III
gaming monopoly, than in situations involving federally recognized tribes. In dicta, the Artichoke
Joe’s opinion used the analogy of state subdivisions to marshal its equal protection arguments:

Were the tribal lands a political subdivision of the State, California’s exemption
of tribal lands from its state-wide prohibition on class III gaming activities easily
would withstand constitutional scrutiny. When enacting substantive regulations
or prohibitions of vice activities, the interests implicated lie at the heart of the
state’s police power. With regard to these activities, a state is free to enact
legislation that accords different treatment to different localities, and even to
different establishments within the same locality, so long as that determination is
tied to a legitimate interest in the health, safety or welfare of its citizens. The
state may make such distinctions by local-option laws, or by making the
distinction between different areas itself. It may impose more stringent
regulations by way of local restrictions, or it may exempt an area entirely. …
Unless such legislative distinctions infringe fundamental rights or involve suspect
classifications, they generally survive equal protection analysis.171
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“reasonable”).
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In the case of state tribes, a state-created Indian reservation would arguably be a political
subdivision of the state and fall squarely within the argument. Consequently, the state would have
enormous power to permit Class III gaming on a state Indian reservation to the exclusion of other
locales.
Finally, extending the monopoly on Class III gaming from federal tribes to federal and state
tribes would concord with the general gaming policies of several states that allow exceptions to
their anti-casino policies when proceeds benefit government or non-profit purposes, fulfilling a
legitimate state interest in providing funding for such entities.172 For example, California’s
constitution has long provided exceptions to its anti-gaming provisions by permitting a state lottery
to generate income for the state government. Permitting Class III gaming by California’s state
recognized tribes would go a long way toward providing for tribal government coffers, just as the
California lottery does for the state.

CONCLUSION FOUR: Gaming by state-recognized tribes does not violate equal protection laws
that forbid state governments from discriminating in favor of one racial group, because state tribes
are political groups, and not racially-defined entities.

E.

Significant Policy Arguments Support Gaming By State-Recognized Tribes
Finally, just as with federal tribal government gaming, numerous policy arguments support

recognizing Class III gaming rights for state recognized tribes. These include generating jobs and
revenue for tribal governments and thereby fostering self-sufficiency; raising revenue for and
increasing economic activity in surrounding communities; supporting the most documented of the
172

See Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(c) (permitting bingo for charitable purposes) and § 19(d)

(authorizing establishment of a California state lottery).
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nation’s non-federally recognized tribes while they wait out the often protracted federal recognition
process; and upholding the sovereign rights of both states and the tribes they recognize.
1.

Proceeds From Tribal Gaming Benefit States and Tribes By Generating Jobs and

Revenue
As with federal tribal gaming, state tribal gaming has the potential to provide tremendous
social and economic benefits for tribal governments, local communities, and states. Gaming by
federally recognized tribes “has generated thousands of jobs; created a market for local suppliers;
raised revenue to benefit local charities; helped remove members of both gaming and non-gaming
tribes from welfare rolls; generated millions of dollars in state and federal taxes; provided schools
for tribal youth; and reinvested in local communities.”173 According to the 2004 Meister report, the
impact of tribal gaming on the national economy has been significant, having contributed 460,000
jobs, $16.3 billion in wages, $42.7 billion in output and $5.3 billion in tax revenue. Through
revenue sharing programs, approximately $759 million has been forwarded to the states.174 The
even more recent Analysis of the Economic Impact of Indian Gaming in 2004, published in 2005 by
the National Indian Gaming Association, suggests that those benefits are only growing: total
revenues generated by Indian gaming have jumped to a staggering $18.5 billion. More than half a
million jobs have been created by tribal gaming and ancillary businesses, reducing federal
government unemployment benefits and welfare payments by $1.4 billion. More than $100 million
has been generated for local businesses, as well as $1.8 billion in state government revenue, and
$5.5 billion in federal taxes.175 Gaming by state recognized tribes would only add to these figures.
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2.

State Recognition Is a Viable Alternative To The Unwieldy Federal Recognition Process
The creation of state tribal casinos would also enable state recognized tribes – those which

arguably have the strongest cases for federal recognition – to strengthen their economies and
provide valuable services for their tribal members while they await federal recognition. Securing
federal recognition is not a simple alternative for tribes. While there are three possible paths to
obtaining such recognition, they are time consuming, difficult and often enormously expensive to
navigate – if they work at all. For many tribes, any chance of federal recognition is decades off …
decades during which significant good could be done for the tribal government and surrounding
communities, and decades during which their inherent rights as sovereign tribes have been put on
pause.
The first option for such tribes is to try to gain recognition through the federal legislative
process. This is so difficult to achieve, however, that Congress has granted recognition to only two
California Indian tribes in the last 10 years.176
The second and most common route is for tribes to secure recognition through the executive
process, as represented by the BIA and its formal acknowledgement process set forth in 25 C.F.R. §
83 et seq. This route, however, may be the most time consuming of all. The BIA’s process
involves a number of steps: each tribe must first file a letter of intent requesting federal recognition

176

See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1300m-1 (granting federal recognition to the Paskenta Band of Nomlaki

Indians in 1994); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1300n-2 (granting federal recognition to the Federated
Indians of Graton Rancheria in 2000). Two other tribes – the Ione Band of Miwok Indians and the
Lower Lake tribe– had their recognition clarified administratively. E-mail from Cindy Darcy,
Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, to Alexa Koenig, Instructor of Law, University of San
Francisco School of Law (August 1, 2005) (on file with the author).

63

and noting that tribe’s intent to submit a documented petition.177 Second, the tribe must submit a
documented petition,178 and third, the tribe must present evidence that demonstrates it can meet the
mandatory criteria laid out in 25 C.F.R. § 83.7. The Gabrielino-Tongva Tribe has filed several
letters of intent, reserving Petition Nos. 140, 140a, 176 and 201, to begin the recognition process.
Because the BIA operates very slowly,179 the BIA is not expected to consider No. 140 – the tribe’s
first shot at recognition -- for more than a decade. The Shinnecocks first filed for recognition in the
1970s; their petition has similarly languished without resolution for years. The process has proven
so unwieldy, even the man who created it in 1978 calls it a “monster,” admitting that “the standards
got to be impossible.”180
The third option is to try to secure recognition judicially. This route is neither easy nor
routine. One type of judicial recognition is “federal common law” recognition. Courts have
declared many state recognized tribes, including the Gabrielino-Tongva, 181 federal common law
tribes. These are defined as “a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community
under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined
177
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territory.”182 Federal common law recognition means that the tribe is recognized as a sovereign tribal
entity for limited purposes,183 such as whether a particular court has jurisdiction over the tribe.
However, federal common law tribes do not receive the full range of benefits that accrue with
formal recognition by the BIA, including the right to conduct Class III gaming under federal law.184
While federal common law tribal status provides yet another indication of the strong evidence
underlying a tribes’ fight for federal recognition and another sign of a tribes’ government structure,
such recognition falls far short of the measures needed to foster self-sufficiency.
An innovative case is currently being tried that offered the possibility of expanding the role
of judicial recognition. As noted above, in New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation,185 Judge Platt
stayed a case that had been brought to enjoin the state recognized Shinnecock tribe from building a
tribal casino, pending the BIA’s determination of the tribe’s federal status. After the BIA admitted
182
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There, the tribe was ultimately recognized as a federal common law sovereign, even though it was
not recognized by the Secretary of the Interior as a tribe for the purpose of receiving federal
recognition benefits. See id.
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that it could not meet the court’s 18-month deadline, and in recognition of the more than 25 years
the tribe has already waited for federal recognition, the court joined the United States as an
“involuntary plaintiff” and declared it might determine itself whether the tribe had to be
“acknowledged” as meeting the requirements for formal federal recognition.186 In May 2005,
however, the government’s motion to be dismissed as a party was granted by the court.
Consequently, this path to federal recognition remains untested; even if Judge Platt had taken it
upon himself to recognize the tribe through the judiciary, such an act would have been challenged;
those unhappy with the decision would have argued that the court exceeded its powers and usurped
the right of the executive branch to acknowledge Indian tribes. The separation of powers argument
and the normal appellate process would have prevented resolution for quite some time.
3.

Gaming By State Recognized Tribes Respects State and Tribal Sovereignty
Finally, permitting states and state recognized tribes to enter into gaming agreements would

honor both state and tribal sovereignty, concordant with modern notions of federalism as well as the
time-honored federal policy favoring tribal independence. Congress’s express purpose for
regulating the tribal gaming industry has been to promote “tribal economic development, self186
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federal status was still unresolved. See generally Shinnecock Indian Nation Website,
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sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”187 As asserted in IGRA’s legislative history, “for those
tribes that have entered into the business of [gaming], the income often means the difference
between an adequate governmental program and a skeletal program that is totally dependent on
Federal funding.”188 The recognition of gaming rights in federally recognized tribes has meant
increased autonomy for hundreds of tribal governments. It is time for a greater recognition of state
authority to recognize tribes, and to allow that authority to address local conditions. Selfsufficiency should be within reach of not only federally recognized tribes, but those few that have
earned the respect and recognition of the various states.

CONCLUSION FIVE: Significant policy arguments, consistent with IGRA policies to support the
economic well-being of federal tribes, also support gaming by state-recognized tribes under state
law.

IV.

Summary
Ultimately, in our federalist system, state tribes and the states that recognize them should

have the right to decide whether to conduct gaming activities on state-dominion land, including
state Indian reservations, under state law. Recognizing state and tribal authority to reach an
agreement without the sanction of federal involvement would enable state governments and the
tribes they recognize to generate revenue for economic stability and diversification. State power,
as originally envisioned by the federalist system, would be revived. Additionally, recognizing the
validity of state tribal gaming concords with Congress’s goal of promoting stronger tribal
187

Artichoke Joe’s II, 353 F.3d at 715.

188

See S. Rep. No. 446, at 2-3 (1988), reprinted in1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3072 (additional views

of John McCain).

67

governments and increased tribal self-sufficiency. By recognizing that states have the right to
authorize state tribal gaming to bona fide tribes within their borders, important notions of federalism
and sovereignty will be advanced, ensuring our nation’s most disregarded tribal governments are no
longer lost in the shuffle.
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